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Abstract  
In an era of continuing Local Government austerity and enhanced urban financialisation, 
Local Government in England is increasingly reliant upon decentralised methods of urban 
finance (typically based on 'new economic growth' extracted from non-residential property 
development) to fund public services, economic development and urban regeneration. 
Opportunities for greater territorial governance and economic development often frame fiscal 
decentralisation, yet, critical appraisals of this agenda are less common. Reflecting upon this 
issue, this paper critically appraises the underlying method of 'localist' finance in England, the 
Business Rate Retention Scheme (BRRS). In doing so, it describes a picture of geographical 
variegation in England, one that suggests that the BRRS could lead to splintered urban 
development, based on the necessity (and underlying viability) for new development. The 
paper concludes that a minority of 'premium locations,' characterised by buoyant property 
market characteristics, could outperform more numerous 'stranded' and 'redundant locations.' 
The result is that those areas most in need of investment, that exhibit some kind of market 
failure and geographical disadvantage, could be less able to generate new development in 
order to fund the BRRS. Under these conditions, rather than correcting incidences of spatial 
inequality, fiscal decentralisation could further polarise uneven development. 
 
Keywords 
Financialisation, fiscal decentralisation, public services, business rate retention, urban regeneration, 
economic development, spatial inequality.   
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Introduction and theoretical argument  
The current hyperbole associated with devolution in England would have us believe that 
enhanced territorial governance and localism is bound up with, and dependant on, fiscal 
decentralisation. This paper scrutinizes this assumption and suggests that this argument is 
scarcely borne out when distilled against the variegated economic geography in England. 
Presently, fiscal decentralisation is a popular concern for those involved in the co-ordination 
and development of urban resources in towns, cities and regions (Martin et al., 2015). Several 
interconnected intellectual perspectives and normative orientations influence this agenda. It 
can be associated with the international trend towards decentralised government provision 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003), 'roll back' and 'roll out' neo-liberalism (Peck and Tickell, 
2002; Peck, 2010) and urban financialisation and infrastructure provision (Pike and Pollard, 
2010; Christopherson et al., 2013). In England, it can be viewed as a result of the drive 
towards austerity since 2010 (MacKinnon, 2015) and the argument for enhanced territorial 
powers characterised by growth based market reforms (Clifford and Morphet, 2015; Goodwin 
et al, 2012., Cox, 2009; Brenner, 2003). In recent years this agenda has been championed and 
actively promoted in England by various special interest groups such as the London Finance 
Group (2013), the City Growth Commission (2014) Republica (2015) and perhaps most 
prominently the Core Cities Group (2015) and their Modern Charter for Local Freedom.
i
  
 However, the speed with which fiscal decentralisation (and its associated tools of 
urban finance) is taking place, makes it imperative to understand its implications for the 
funding of welfare provision, economic development and urban regeneration. So far 
devolution, especially of financial powers, has largely been received as an untrammelled 
good in England and has received little critical attention, (Strickland, 2013, is a notable 
exception in this area, scrutinizing urban financialisation). In comparison, localist methods of 
urban finance have received more critical reflection in international literature. During the last 
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decade, Weber (2010) has made significant inroads into the Tax Increment Finance agenda in 
North America, Aalbers (2012) has investigated the international mortgage securitisation 
market, while Gotham (2009, 2014) has appraised the sub-prime mortgage fallout and 
disaster relief funding. 
 In comparison, the cursory perspective in England fails to critically explore what lies 
beneath this potential 'Trojan Horse'. Presciently, Healey (2013) warns that promoting new 
urban policy without first giving attention to its potential impacts, before and after 
implementation, may do more harm than good. In concurrence, the contention in this paper is 
that the continuing decentralisation of funding and the responsibility for its governance to 
Local Government, raises profound questions for the way towns, cities and regions are 
produced and governed in England. Certainly, there are open questions in relation to how 
exogenous urban finance policies and practices become 'localized,' and what they mean for 
the coordination of local public services, economic development, urban regeneration and 
more broadly, the quality of life of those people living in different locations.   
 This paper tackles this deficit by appraising and interpreting the retained business rate 
retention scheme (BRRS) which has replaced the traditional Local Government Formula 
Grant funding mechanism in England
ii
. In doing so the intention of this English case study is 
to engage existing, and develop new theoretical interpretations about how real estate interests, 
financial products and Local Government techniques interact and coalesce in different 
locations. Hitherto, very few studies have appraised an entire country, instead relying upon 
few or distinct city case studies. The relative size of England, compared to large countries, 
affords this opportunity. 
 In order to reflect upon this issue this paper traces the historical tradition of Local 
Government finance in England, its ongoing synergism with commercial real estate, it's 
financial 'worth' and the policy argument for decentralisation. It then unpacks the BRRS 
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model, outlining some of its inherent complexities and practical implications (focusing in on 
the 'stripping out' procedure), before outlining a broad typology of locations that describe 
how fiscal decentralisation, construed through the BRRS, could impact local governance and 
spatial development. A central argument introduced in this section is that the success or 
failure of the BRRS is bound up with the economics of commercial real estate development. 
Thereupon, the paper centres these reflections in the international urban financialisation 
literature in order to contemplate the potential implications for England. Inspired by this 
reflection, this paper offers an alternative reading of fiscal decentralisation in England. It 
argues that the co-dependent narratives of 'growth' and 'localism' in the BRRS are being 
mobilised to justify the switching, re-territorialisation and reinvigoration of capital in 
privileged areas of the contemporary built environment. The paper then concludes with a call 
for a research focus into fiscal decentralisation and new methods of Local Government 
finance, in particular its oversight and distributive tendencies. 
 
The genealogy of Local Government finance: The business of tax 
 
Unquestionably, Local Government in England  has gone through a process of fundamental 
reform. Since 2010 the veil of austerity, deficit reduction and localism has been used to 
radically reduce the size and influence of Local Government. However, it is also true that 
Local Government is still fundamentally important to urban innovation as it continues to 
mediate urban development through regulation and new financial instruments (Mazzucato, 
2013). In England, fiscal decentralisation is congested and difficult to navigate with 
numerous tools and models available for deployment, something that Pugalis and Bentley 
(2013) have described as an 'entrepreneurial climate of chaos.' Sitting alongside the 
traditional prudential borrowing powers of Local Government and the public works loan 
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board (PWLB), there is the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), the EU backed JESSICA 
and Chrysalis funds administered by HCA, the Regional Growth Fund (RGF), the Growing 
Places Fund (GPF) and the Local Growth Fund (LGF). There are small scale Business 
Improvement Districts (BIDS), larger scale Enterprise Zones (EZ), generalised Tax 
Increment Financing (TIF)
iii
  and the more powerful New Development Deals seen in 
Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield
iv
. More exotic yet is the Greater Manchester 'earn back' 
model and the newly inaugurated  Municipal Bond Agency
v
. The intention is for all of these 
models to sit within the BRRS (or be carved out by special legislative decree
vi
).  
 Rachel Weber (2010) best captures the international focus on urban finance and local 
governance when she appraises and critiques tax increment financing and the purchasing and 
selling of urban debt within international financial markets in North America. However, 
through the BRRS, Central Government in England has pursued a different path. Rather than 
the spatially located ring fenced TIF model in North America, the BRRS is based upon a 
defined rate of return, part of which is retained locally, and part of which is sent back to 
Central Government for reapportionment. As a result, the urban finance methods that Weber 
(2010) describes are relatively rare in England, restricted to New Development Deal areas 
and to a certain degree, the earn back model in Manchester. However, proceeding sections 
will demonstrate that the English BRRS is very different to the TIF arrangements in North 
America. This is because the intention behind TIF's is to favour areas that are disadvantaged, 
to narrow uneven development by giving blighted areas a leg up. In contrast, the underlying 
mechanism of BRSS benefits those areas already advantaged.   
 Illustrating the venerable age of  urban financilisation, the genealogy of BRRS, and its 
underlying method of taxation based on property, can be traced back in history to the 1660 
Poor Law and the collection of the 'poor rate' from property owners. The present system of 
property tax, business rates, is a national tax which is administered locally between local 
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authorities and the national valuation office (VOA). It replaced the previous 'general rate' 
system in 1990, which was a locally set rate of tax based on rental value applied to all 
domestic and non domestic property. In England there are 326 local billing authorities 
responsible for collecting business rate tax from nearly 1.8 million hereditaments
vii
  (typically 
shops, offices, warehouses and factories).  Illustrating the magnitude of the business rate 
system, Table 1 describes the rateable value
viii
 and total number of hereditaments for each 
commercial property class in England based on 2012 data.  
 
Table 1 Rateable value and the number of properties by bulk class category  
Category Number of properties 
(thousands) 
Rateable value (Millions) 
Retail 528 16,666 
Office 341 13,799 
Industrial 425 11,279 
Other 136 2,678 
Excluded 324 12,291 
Total 1,754 56,713 
Sources: http://www.voa.gov.uk/corporate/statisticalRelease 2012 
 
 Currently, councils in England collect some £22.4bn of business rates each year 
(DCLG, 2014). Business rates are calculated in relation to the rateable value using the 
standard national business rate multiplier which currently stands at 48.2p in 2014/15 (47.1 for 
small businesses). This means that if a property has a rateable value of £100,000 it would 
have a £48,200 property tax bill. The business rate multiplier is adjusted each year according 
to the Retail Price Index (RPI). It is also adjusted during the  periodic national revaluation 
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exercise to make sure that overall national property tax yield remains constant before and 
after national revaluation. Under the former grant system of funding, no sooner had this 
income been generated at the local authority level than it was sent to the Central Government 
Treasury, and then redistributed back down to individual local authorities.  
 
The argument for fiscal devolution 
 
The English Local Government finance system is one of the most centralised in the world.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2010) calculated 
that local authorities in the USA, Spain, France, Germany, Spain and Japan all have greater 
control over local budgets than do their counterparts in England.  According to the DCLG 
(2011) traditional methods of financial redistribution (most notably the Formula Grant 
methodology) denied local authorities control over locally raised income. They also deprived 
local authorities of the certainty needed to plan investment over the long term. In response, 
DCLG (2011:4) stated that, 
 
 'This Government is determined to repatriate business rates.  No more should proud 
 cities be forced to come to national government with a begging bowl'  
 
 DCLG (2011) argued that if local authorities are to fulfil their role as autonomous, 
effective agents of change, then new directives such as the General Power of Competence in 
the Localism Bill must be balanced with enhanced financial control. This isn't necessarily a 
new proposition, in recent decades several Government reviews, including the Layfield 
Committee in 1976, the Balance of Funding Review in 2004, the Lyons Inquiry in 2007, and 
more recently the Heseltine No Stone Unturned report in 2013 and the Adonis Mending the 
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Fractured State report in 2014, have all linked local control of finance to enhanced local 
democracy. This was solidified in a raft of Coalition Government documents which included 
the Localism Bill (2010), Open Public Services (2011), and the Local Government Resource 
Review (2011:9) which claimed that decentralisation will,  
 
 'Give power, money and knowledge to those best placed to find the right local 
 solutions; and improve the relationship between government and those being 
 governed.' 
 
The Coalition Government argued that under Formula Grant, local authorities could suffer a   
fiscal disincentive when it came to promoting economic growth.  This is because the costs of 
local development, for instance disruption during construction, the provision of services, 
congestion and opposition from local communities, can all result in net costs that are not 
always recouped (DCLG, 2012b). Tellingly, research by Cheshire et al. (2008) and the Centre 
for Cities (2011) suggest that decentralised business rate models will help roll back decades 
of  land supply restrictions. Both studies claim that nationalisation of business rates after 
1990 resulted in planning restrictions and therefore less development. The rationale in both 
documents is that decentralising these same powers will result in reinvigorated development. 
Easing this situation, the consultation document for the BRSS (DCLG, 2011:12) concluded 
that,  
 
 'Developers will find local authorities have greater incentives to grant planning 
 permissions for appropriately-sited and well-planned non-residential development in 
 order to go for growth.' 
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The Business Rate Retention Scheme (BRRS) 
 
The Coalition Government attest that the BRRS reverses the regressive tendencies of the 
previous Formula Grant funding model, fulfilling two primary policy aims, 'localism' and the 
pursuit of 'economic growth.' Figure 2 describes the seven stage process at the heart of the 
BRRS model in England.  
 
Figure 2 The Business Rate Retention Model in England 
 
Source: Adapted from DCLG, 2012a 
 The first stage in 2013/14 was to set a baseline for each local authority. Then in order 
to achieve a ‘fair’ starting point, Central Government calculated a tariff or top up amount for 
each local authority (stage 2). Those authorities with business rates in excess of their baseline 
level of funding are asked to pay a tariff to Central Government, those authorities with 
business rates yield below their baseline would receive a top up grant from Central 
Government (top ups and tariffs are adjusted in proceeding years against RPI). This means a 
division into tariff and top up authorities in order to recognise that some local authorities will 
1. Setting the baseline 
2. Setting tarriffs and top ups 
3. The incentive effect 
4. A levy recouping a share of 
dispropionate benifit 
5. Adjusting for revaluation 
6. Resetting the system 
7. pooling 
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receive more business rate income than they did under the previous Formula Grant system 
while others will receive considerably less. In future years (stage 3) local authorities would 
keep a significant proportion of any growth in business rates above the initial baseline. If 
business rates decreased or did not grow as much in future years, they would see revenue fall. 
If some local authorities experience disproportionate growth, i.e. those with high business 
rate tax bases, a levy (stage 4) is imposed to recoup a share of this growth in order to 
redistribute to those authorities that see significant reductions in business rate income or to 
fund regeneration schemes in high growth areas (such as New Development Deal areas). 
Every five years (stage 5) the model is adjusted to take into account movements in the 
business rate yield resulting from periodic national valuation assessments. Then, every 10 
years (stage 6) the model is reset (the next is due in 2020) to evaluate and ensure that 
resources meet the needs of service pressures sufficiently and that the gap between growth 
and disadvantaged areas is not too great. The final stage, pooling (stage 7) gives local 
authorities the opportunity to pool their resources with neighbouring authorities
ix
. 
 The model is clearly complex (perhaps its main weakness), however for the purpose 
of this paper attention is paid to stage 3, the incentive effect and stage 5, adjusting for 
revaluation. The incentive effect means that local authorities in England are encouraged to 
increase the size of their business rate base in order to create revenue to pay for local service 
provision, economic development and urban regeneration. The retained business rate model 
has given all local authorities in England the powers and responsibility to retain a proportion 
of accrued business rate taxation and any growth thereupon (up to 50% in the current 
formulation) (DCLG, 2014). This allows local decision makers the opportunity and incentive 
to expand local taxation by competing with other areas in England for occupier demand in a 
form of urban entrepreneurialism and inter urban competition (Schipper, 2014). DCLG 
(2011:4) explained that,  
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 'Any council that grows its local economy will be better off under the new system. 
 This will create the right incentives for them to work closely with local businesses, 
 helping to create the conditions for growth, and giving local leaders reasons to 
 celebrate their successes, not conceal them.'  
 
However, the adjustment for revaluation that takes place every five years strips out any 
increase in urban growth (through the adjustments in the top up and tariff mechanism), the 
only growth that remains is that associated with net new floor space, either derived from new 
build construction or repurposed floor space. The critical point therefore, is that the relative 
increase in rental values of existing properties cannot be capitalised
x
.    
 
Extracting value through urban development 
 
The ‘stripping out’ procedure happens for two inter-related reasons,  
1. The nature of the property rating system in England 
2. Consequent policy choice 
 
 Reflecting on the first reason, aggregate property tax yield at the national level has 
been fixed across revaluations since 1990. If aggregate property tax yield doubles (reflecting 
economic growth) then the national business rate multiplier is halved, leaving Central 
Government with the same rate income as before revaluation. However, this method is 
skewed because of the incredible growth seen in the most powerful property markets, 
typically in central London, which leads to perverse consequences. For instance, it is entirely 
possible for local authority areas to experience increase in rateable value but reduction in rate 
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yield. This happens because growth in such areas is less than the national average (at the last 
revaluation over 200 local authorities saw a decrease in yield); only those authorities who see 
yield growth above the national average would receive any benefit. The national average is 
artificially high because of the gravitational influence of London property prices which 
traditionally drives the scale of the multiplier change and results in a kind of geographical 
yield asymmetry. To illustrate this effect, Westminster Council, a consequence of its property 
portfolio value, raises 6% of the overall national total, more than Newcastle, Manchester, 
Liverpool and Birmingham combined (ODPM, 2004).    
 This leads to the second reason, the consequent 'policy change.' In an ideal world,  
local authority rateable value would be fully reflected in its property tax yield but it is 
difficult to justify this when property tax yield is subject to the perversities of national 
calculation and the gravitational pull of the London property market. Areas, which 
traditionally see rateable value increase but yield decrease, would be at a distinct 
disadvantage, especially when local authorities are dependent on their income to fund local 
services. Hence, in order to counter property tax yield volatility, the policy decision is to alter 
the top up and tariffs mechanism in the BRRS following national revaluation. This is to make 
sure that all local authorities are in the same position either side of revaluation.  
 To summarise, there are traditionally two methods of extracting value from the built 
environment in order to generate 'growth' (new money) in urban finance. The first involves 
building new properties in order to create 'new' business rate yield. The second involves 
investment in current property stock and its surrounding area in order to increase its inherent 
value. In England, in the majority of circumstances, the latter method, is unrewarded, quite 
literally devaluing the exiting built environment. Furthermore, the minority of areas that can 
attract and are conducive to new development, those with buoyant rental market structures, 
have a distinct advantage over the majority of areas that cannot. Indeed, a central argument in 
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this paper is that the BRRS is not really predicated upon the ability to engender economic 
growth, rather, it is founded upon the ability to create new floor space through new build 
construction or floor space conversion.  
 
Decanting fiscal decentralisation  
 
The need to generate growth through business rate portfolio expansion, could result in uneven 
development (Harvey, 2006, 2010). This is because reliance on the development of new floor 
space effectively 'games' the BRRS in favour of those areas that have buoyant rental markets. 
This creates a situation where the BRRS is based upon the spatial economics of property 
development, rather than the creation of economic growth. Under this formalisation, what is 
built and where it is built, is driven by relative rental structure, yield and the perceptions and 
motivations of various property development and investment interests (Bryson, 1997). 
Locations with vibrant economies and demonstrable demand for property are likely to attract 
a different type of property developer and investor than unprofitable development locations. 
This underlines the perennial argument of Pryke (1994), that property development is central 
to all geographic understandings of the city.  The following section begins to describe this 
uneven geography by developing a broad typology of locations in England, namely 'premium 
locations', 'stranded locations', and 'redundant locations.'  
 The typology is inspired by Weber's (2010:252) reflection that,  
 
'A generalised pressure to attract capital does not mean that Local Governments have 
been equally financialised across space.' 
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The formulation of the outline typology  is based upon the potential ability of local 
authorities to capitalise their urban assets  into the BRRS model of urban finance. In doing so, 
it reflects upon the contention of Leyson and Thrift (2007) and Weber (2010), that the ability 
to create and monetise new urban asset classes is an underlying feature of contemporary 
public sector service delivery. The underlying geographical unit of analysis in this typology is 
the local authority administrative area, chosen because this is the primary basis for the BRRS. 
However, the typology could just as easily be applied to functional economic areas at the sub 
region and regional level.   
 
Premium Locations 
 
Premium locations are most adept at exploiting and actualising the twin BRRS policy 
objectives of 'localism' and 'growth.' Capitalising on buoyant property market characteristics, 
such locations are relatively autonomous because they are able to leverage the more or less 
guaranteed ability to promote new floor space creation. Investment yields in these locations 
create  attractive propositions for global property investors who view property as a long term 
investment medium. This gives premium locations an automatic advantage over other areas 
because it is these institutional investors and global investment capital, that determine, when, 
where and how commercial floor space is developed (Bryson, 1997). Perhaps these locations 
are the ones that have the right to truly call themselves 'entrepreneurial,' as growth coalitions, 
including the public sector, developers, financiers and their respective intermediaries 
determine, shape and reshape urban development. These locations have the inherent ability to 
exploit and strategise their real estate development, creating and securitizing growth, and in 
turn, linking into international circuits of capital and financilisation. This is because 
commercial real estate in such locations is more liquid and fungible and can be repackaged 
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into alternative financialised products and traded on the capital markets.  These locations are 
able to exploit the  mechanisms through which place based assets are increasingly 
transformed into financial products in the global market place (Aalbers, 2008; Gotham, 2006, 
2009; Newman 2009).  
 These locations have most in common with the North American system of debt 
finance and international bond markets. Echoing the work of Weber (2010) and Molotch 
(1976), such locations debunk the myth that public service delivery and urban development is 
solely a local activity, rather it is a nexus of international financial products, local property 
market interests and mediating Government practices at the local and national scale. In 
England, these locations are typically few, a consequence of their relative size, and  include 
the central London boroughs, the 'core cities' of Birmingham, Bristol, Nottingham, Sheffield, 
Manchester, Liverpool and Newcastle (and their cousins over the border Edinburgh and 
Glasgow) and increasingly the 'Metros' (which also include Reading, Oxford and Cambridge) 
described recently by the Local Growth Commission (2014). On top of their ability to exploit 
the BRRS,  it is no coincidence that these locations are pushing for increased fiscal 
decentralisation to further cement their premium position. Greater Manchester has been 
awarded the opportunity to trial 100% rate retention under the BRRS as the 50% model is not 
considered sufficient to exploit the full growth potential of this 'Northern Powerhouse.' In 
addition, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield have New Development Deal Area status 
which allows them to also keep 100% of business rates expansion in specified geographical 
areas. Indeed, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in the run up to the 2015 general 
election that,  
 
'Where cities grow their economies through local initiatives, let me be clear: we will 
support and reward them.' 
17 
 
 
Stranded Locations  
 
Stranded locations have relatively buoyant business rate portfolios in terms of quantity but 
find it difficult to utilise the BRRS growth incentive. The current formulation of the BRRS, 
particularly the 'stripping out procedure,' hinders these locations from achieving their full 
economic potential. This can be because of the historical nature of the built environment, 
restrictions in the availability of space to build new properties, or more simply, a general 
satisfaction with the current composition of commercial real estate in such locations. Local 
authorities like Westminster Council, the holder of one of the most valuable business rate 
portfolios in England (see section 2), argues that its hands are tied because it cannot 
maximise the income from all of its property assets for growth (a consequence of restrained 
expansion space and the lack of appetite for redevelopment or conversion). Westminster  
should not see any decline in tax relative to their baseline funding level (dependent on the 
accuracy of the baseline assessment) however they will not be able to manage their existing 
assets in order to generate any new growth because of the primacy given to new floor space 
construction. Historical towns and cities with a dearth of high value listed properties, such as 
Liverpool, Durham, York and Bath could find themselves in a similar situation. This could 
also apply to historical parts of the Oxford and Cambridge 'metro' areas, chosen for growth 
by the Local Growth Commission but potentially prevented from doing so by one of its 
associated policies. In such locations it is not practical to demolish are re-purpose these 
buildings when they are perfectly viable in their current state, nor is it sensible to build more 
property as this may lead to displacement. This indicates that the BRRS isn't just predicated 
on the ability to build buildings, it is also path dependant, constrained by what has been built 
previously. 
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 A prescient report by Wilcox (2012) for the Centre for Cities, noticed that those areas 
reliant on their existing property stock for income generation and 'growth' were at a distinct 
disadvantage under BRRS. Stranded locations fully embrace the contemporary agendas of 
growth and competition, but cannot mobilise the growth potential in their commercial 
building stock in order to pursue this end. Furthermore, the inability to create growth (which 
is then securitized to fund new infrastructure) in stranded locations, due to the stripping out 
procedure, could lead to infrastructure deficits and funding shortfalls in the future as the need 
for infrastructure investment becomes increasingly acute. In contrast, under the widely 
utilised ring fenced TIF arrangements in North America, it is possible to invest in local 
infrastructure through the urban environment. In these locations, new roads, bridges, ICT 
infrastructure and the removal of poorly performing buildings create local property value 
uplift. This enables recouping of development costs through value capture mechanisms. 
However, in England, similar arrangements like New Development Deals, are only located in 
premium locations which imbue demonstrable growth potential.  This presents a circular risk, 
stranded locations are obstructed from generating growth and consequently cannot fund the 
infrastructure needs of tomorrow.  
 
Redundant Locations 
 
Redundant locations are disadvantaged because of their inferior property market 
characteristics, such locations have either marginal or negative development values
xi
 and 
cannot generate  high enough rental levels to justify the costs of new development. 
Concurrently, these locations may also be shrinking due to economic change and 
demographic adjustment. Redundant locations are typically associated with older, secondary 
property markets which exhibit depressed rental levels and low levels of occupier demand.  
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Institutional investors will not provide finance for development in these locations because 
they are unprofitable and do not conform to the conventions of the global institutional 
investment market. Consequently, redundant locations are dislocated from urban 
financialisation because they cannot access the principle means of financing commercial 
floor space. In such locations, development projects frequently fail viability testing because 
there isn't any demand for new property which makes pre-lets and speculative development 
impossible to achieve. Consequently, vacant sites and obsolete or derelict buildings, rather 
than net new floor space, could be a regular occurrence in such locations.  
 While stranded locations may still have a degree of autonomy and relative stability, 
due to the overall size of their business rate portfolios, redundant locations could fall further 
behind the rest of England. It is problematic for these locations to exploit the BRRS as they 
don't have the underlying growth potential or critical business rate mass to pay for public 
services, nor do they have the lobbying power to justify the more exotic finance tools seen in 
premium locations. Consistent with the theory of Stiglitz (2015) that economic inequality, 
results in political inequality, these locations do not have local autonomy and are dependent 
on the built in compensation instruments in the BRRS (the top and tariff and safety net 
stabilisers). These compensation instruments are paid to any council who can demonstrate a 
fall in business rates receipts by more than 7.5% relative to their baseline funding level each 
year. Further exacerbating this situation, any resets to the BRRS system, designed to realign 
the system with urban need, only take place every 10 years. 
  Rehearsing an argument of Bryson (1997), as access to Government grant aid 
recedes, redundant locations will be increasingly reliant on the rental structures of their local 
property markets to create adequate return for development capital. However, it is difficult to 
conceive a set of circumstances where this can take place without some kind of incentive 
mechanism, consequently, it will be very difficult to justify public services that are not 
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financially productive (as per the argument of Leyshon and Thrift 2007). Several areas stand 
out as being threatened under this regime in England, but those at particular risk are those 
areas that have suffered from long term economic decline and shrinkage, often exacerbated 
by the recent recession. These locations are typically situated in the North, such as Teesside, 
Humberside, Grimsby, Scunthorpe, Bury, Oldham, Crewe and the Black Country, indicating 
that it is often the small towns and cities that suffer urban decline rather than the big cities 
(The Economist, 2013).  
 These locations exhibit an inherited built environment characterised by obsolete and 
redundant land and buildings, a consequence of their previous economic function. The 
traditional approach to ameliorate this situation would be to pursue comprehensive and 
sustained regeneration strategies that increased the overall vitality and value of an area, 
primarily through gap funding the economic shortfall in physical development projects. At 
the same time, initiatives like the Neighbourhood Initiative Fund (later the Neighbourhoods 
Fund), were specifically designed to address issues of inequality in the poorest areas. This 
helped redundant locations to boost physical, economic and social renewal in order to adjust 
to new futures. In the main, these facilities no longer exist, and under the rubric of the 
localism agenda, local authorities are largely expected to come up with their own 
regeneration solutions to economic decline, while Central Government plays a strategic and 
supporting role. It is in these locations where the challenge and contradiction of the neo-
liberal agenda is most acute.  
 
Splintered urban finance 
 
The opportunity for decentralised financial powers has been welcomed by some civic leaders 
in the UK (most notably those in the Core Cities) as an opportunity for territorial freedom, 
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governance and power. What these city leaders want is power, and the  'roll back' of centuries 
of centralised government, echoing the level of autonomy seen in the rest of Europe and 
North America. Indeed, fiscal decentralisation could continue, Shaw and Mackinnon (2011) 
argue that institutional structures and relations unfold over time, typically this proceeds in the 
direction of more devolution where continued frustration with existing arrangements leads to  
more change (Giordano and Roller, 2004).  
 Combined with the effects of recession, economic restructuring and the radical 
alteration of welfare policy, findings suggest that local growth policies, based on commercial 
property development, could drive spatial inequality and uneven development, rather than 
reduce its manifestation. It is conceivable that this could result in a kind of financialised 
apartheid, where a minority of urban locations outperform the rest of the country. In 2000 
Simon and Marvin used the analogy of the underlying circuits of technology and 
communication to describe the fragmentation and splintering of urban geography. Similarly, 
there is potential for a new and highly polarised urban land landscape to emerge where 
premium property market characteristics (the presence of economic demand, a large tax base, 
buoyant rental levels, the ability to capture property value uplift and expansion space for new 
development) selectively underwrite favoured places and inhabitants. Reminiscent of 
Castell's (2005) redundant user theory, premium locations could outperform and effectively 
bypass stranded and redundant locations through a process of financial selection based on the 
contingent nature of local property market conditions.   
 Continuing the work of Aalbers, 2011; Fields, 2013 and Gotham, 2014, who illustrate 
a relationship between urban financialisation and inequality. Findings suggest that the BRRS 
could be a zero sum method of urban finance where the financial benefits in certain locations 
are counterbalanced and potentially outweighed by uneven development elsewhere. This 
highlights a potential conflict between social need and the new institutional form of urban 
22 
 
governance exhibited in the BRRS. This is because the production of commercial floor space 
is unpredictable and rests upon the turbulent foundations of profitability, relative property 
market structure and the presence of occupier demand. The BRRS fails to recognise that the 
economics of construction  are different in marginal development locations.  
 Furthermore, without careful consideration, the trend toward growth underwritten by 
new floor space construction in premium locations could lead to a period of overbuilding. 
The buoyant property market characteristics in premium locations and the net new floor 
space foundation of the BRRS creates the potential opportunity for a building boom (and a 
kind of growth first super fast urban neo-liberalism) where real estate development, financial 
markets and urban planners operate in overdrive to build new income generating structures in 
order to expand the business rate tax base and create profit (Weber, 2010). Similar findings 
have previously been found in relation to Enterprise Zones in England (Greenhalgh, 2003) 
and in relation to Tax Increment Financing in North America (Weber, 2010). In both 
situations, increased property development took place without an associated increase in the 
quantum of occupier demand. A process of filtering and displacement of existing property 
occupiers into new buildings in a flight to quality followed, the typical consequence in both 
situations was high levels of vacancy in older buildings.  
 Both of these works  proved that all locations can't be better off if they adopt the same 
market led policies of entrepreneurialism and new build development because the contingent 
quantum of occupier demand and its associated jobs and investment is finite. The justification 
for new property development in these situations was linked to the mobilisation of blight and 
obsolescence narratives (Smith, 1996; Weber, 2010) and simultaneous zoning decisions 
which  justify the continual creative destruction of urban capital as it seeks to  re- 
territorialize and maintain profit. However, we contend that in England, there isn't any need 
for this process as the BRRS actively excludes the existing built environment from the onset 
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in the name of localism, growth and the vagaries of the centrally administered property tax 
model.  This policy mechanism creates a situation where the built environment is even more 
responsive to the investment needs of commercial real estate capital in certain privileged 
locations, increasing the turn over time and releasing the inertia of fixed capital trapped in the 
existing bricks and bones of buildings (Bryson, 1997; Weber, 2002). This can be linked to  
Smith's (1984)  'see saw' theory of uneven development where he argued that the 
geographical mobility of surplus value and uneven development are necessary parts of 
capitalism and that this process can explain the creative destruction and gentrification of 
urban neighbourhoods, as mobile capital exploits the conditions of growth while minimising 
its exposure to depreciation.  
 
Urban implications  
 
 Under the BRRS, welfare provision and the necessity for value creation has been 
blurred; the implications for certain English towns and cities could be profound. The focus on 
property market and business rate growth is not appropriate for all locations, especially those 
that do not possess the necessary property market conditions for this kind of finance model. 
Traditionally, regeneration policies and strategies have tried to ameliorate economic and 
social issues in selected communities, typically found in redundant locations, however, the 
reorientation of urban funding toward speculation demonstrates the pursuit of very different 
objectives. These objectives are associated with neo-liberalism, the emergence of New 
Economic Geography (NEG), New Urban Economics (NUE) and the pursuit of economic 
agglomeration (City Growth Commission 2014) which can trace its lineage back to the late 
1980's and the support of the market process in the most, not least favourable locations 
(Boyle, 1988). This results in 'picking winners' in areas of opportunity, under this process, 
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premium locations become the focus of urban policy at the expense of stranded and 
redundant locations in the peripheral estate (Boyle, 1988).  
 Hence, the evolution of urban finance in England should not only be associated with 
devolution, increased autonomy, exotic financial instruments and capital markets. It is a state 
driven enterprise, where normalised urban finance models unbundle and land in ways that 
fragment urban geography around a minority of urban winners. The BRRS in England 
demonstrates that fiscal decentralisation segregates as much as it connects and it does so 
selectively based on contingent commercial property market conditions. This heralds a 
profound change in the traditional objectives of urban regeneration policy. Issues of 
unemployment, social distress and disadvantage could give way to return on investment, 
rental yield, value capture and leverage ratios. In this interpretation, urban regeneration has 
gone through a process of re-appropriation where it is expected to create profit in order to 
fund public services. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that we could be moving from an era of 
urban regeneration to one of urban capitalisation. Furthermore, under the present Government 
regime there is something phony about regeneration in areas of social and market failure, the 
very sense of failure is directly opposed to the Government's focus on growth. Consequently, 
there is an implicit risk that urban finance built around a selection of premium locations could 
disguise the withdrawal of all but the most basic welfare support mechanisms in those areas 
that need it most.  
 Therefore, the contention that fiscal decentralisation provides a basis for autonomous 
decision making and urban control should be viewed critically, as this does not appear to be 
the case for all locations. As practitioners and scholars we must be aware of the assumptions 
quite literally built into the ideas, techniques and organizational structures of the 
unashamedly neo-liberal BRRS. In many ways, the BRRS has led to a redefinition of what 
good public policy is. Traditionally public policy has been associated with a net increase in 
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welfare for the public, now it is associated with how effective the Government has been in 
creating growth. There appears to be a risk in the BRRS, that in certain locations the state 
will promote new urban development through a kind of unwarranted Schumpeterian (1950) 
creative destruction, where new build development, and potential building booms, take place 
without any consideration of, and for, urban demand.  New properties could be created not 
because there is any demonstrable need for them, rather, because they are an efficient means 
of revitalising capital and are the only expedient means of funding the future of public 
services. This puts local authorities in an invidious position, on one hand they are held liable 
for maintaining the appropriate mix and supply of employment land and premises, on the 
other hand they must create new commercial floor space in order to fund their own future.  
  
Conclusion 
 
It is too soon to pass judgement on whether the BRRS signals an unfettered neo-liberal 
Government funding project or the production of a new synergy between the public sector, 
the property market and economic development (Adams and Tiesdell, 2010). Yet, as far back 
as 1976, Harvey Molotch published the 'City as Growth Machine,' in which he suggested that 
the production of real estate was integral to the production and understanding of cities. 
Indeed,  initial findings suggest that there are potentially significant asymmetries and internal 
divisions between wealthy premium locations  and those locations which are not, and 
therefore cannot, take part in fiscal decentralisation. In an example of 'roll back' and roll out' 
neo-liberalism the BRRS has prepared the ground and reconciled the political imperative to 
build with the capitalist demand for liquidity in premium locations. However, elsewhere in 
England,  it has also potentially created a broader conflict between the generation and sharing 
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of wealth. Therefore, there is no point edifying readers with an untrammelled happy ending, 
rather, the reality of fiscal decentralisation seems set for a divergent future.   
 How then to improve understanding in relation to this situation? This is a big 
question, one far beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, the initial reflections in this paper 
are based on a series of predictions in relation to how local authorities may react and how 
property markets will operate under the BRRS. As such, there is the need for some cautionary 
words. The approach to appraise all of England has resulted in broad review rather than 
detailed analysis. Therefore, we must be careful not to over generalise, each location in the 
UK contains a variety of comparable but highly specific real estate markets which are 
contingent and socially produced in each context. Indeed, we must also be distrustful of 
simple binary oppositions between premium, stranded and redundant locations. Rather, it is 
likely that each location will be criss-crossed with variable rental structures and physical 
development that will either aid, or constrain, the creation of new floor space. This is why 
Liverpool, Cambridge and Oxford find themselves in both premium and stranded locations. 
Each of these locations have discernible areas of development potential but also exhibit 
certain areas of historical development which is not suitable for urban capitalisation. Much 
further empirical analysis is therefore needed to understand the locally specific nature of 
urban finance and its impact upon welfare, economic development, regeneration and the life 
chances of people in England.  
 However, what this paper does do is identify a potential spatial variegation inherent in 
the English method of decentralised urban finance. Consequently, the authors call for a 
research focus on Local Government finance  and its associated urban finance models in three 
main areas. Firstly, it is not appropriate to introduce new urban finance processes without 
them being subject to some kind of intellectual oversight. It is therefore important to 
empirically monitor, evaluate and review new tools of urban finance in order to expose the 
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uneven geographical consequences of fiscal decentralisation and contemporary methods of 
urban finance. Second, there is considerable tension between the notion of fiscal devolution 
and equal redistribution and how both concepts might be reconciled. Indeed, the former 
leader of Newcastle City Council, Lord Jeremy Beecham argues that the BRRS could result 
in a case of, 
 
  'Passing the buck, without the bucks.' 
 
     (Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 28th March 2015) 
 
This is because business rate retention, in certain locations, is about the amount of money 
coming into a location, rather than what could be generated in that location, a consequence of 
the variability in geographical tax base in terms of quantity and the concomitant ability for 
that tax base to expand.  
 Third, correctly in the authors view, Martin et al. (2015) have called for the 
devolution of financial powers to the regions and city regions of England, in order to exploit 
their economic potential and ameliorate spatial inequality. However, initial findings in this 
paper suggest that fiscal decentralisation is not straight forward and that we should therefore 
proceed with caution. An engagement with rental structures and the contingent textures of 
locally specific commercial real estate markets, should be incorporated into the scrutiny of 
urban financialisation, in order to help inform the devolution of financial powers. This is 
because the BRRS in England demonstrates that the global strategies of urban financialisation 
and economic development are typically bound up with, construed through, and grounded in 
the relative structures of locally specific commercial real estate markets, which in certain 
scenarios have evolved over centuries of development. We contend that pursuing this 
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approach could help contest the NUE idea that the increasing agglomeration of economic 
activity is a result of market driven 'spatial sorting' of workers and that the contingent effects 
of place are all but irrelevant (Martin et al., 2015).  
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i
 The Core Cities Group is a collective voice for the cities of Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, Glasgow, Leeds, 
Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield (defined as the largest city economies outside of 
London. The Charter for Local Freedom is designed to echo the Magna Carter agreement of 1215 which 
questioned the right of royalty to rule over the whole country. The Charter for Local Freedom questions the 
right of central government to rule over local government.  
 
ii
 We deviate from a UK wide perspective because In Scotland and Wales, the rates collected are pooled at the 
devolved level and redistributed to the billing authorities via a needs-based formula. Scotland also operates a 
Business Rate Incentive Scheme. In Northern Ireland, both the Northern Ireland Executive and the district 
councils set separate rating multipliers, with the full rate liability collected by the councils. 
 
iii
 This method of TIF exists within the BRRS and is subject to the 'levy' and 'top up' and 'tariff' arrangement and 
10 year reset procedure. It is difficult to describe this method as a TIF because the ten year reset system makes 
it problematic to plan income and debt flows over the traditional 25-30 year time frames seen in TIF models. 
'Generalised TIF' more realistically describes traditional prudential borrowing powers within the BRRS system. 
iv
 It is unlikely that this method of finance will be extended as it is funded out of the relatively small BRRS 
safety net. In contrast to BRRS, 'New Development Deals' are not subject to the 'levy' or 'top up' and 'tariff' 
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mechanism. The 25 Enterprise Zones announced since the 2008 also allow value uplift in existing property 
stock but have tight restrictions on geographical coverage.    
 
v
 The Municipal Bond Agency has been created in response to those locations that have expressed an interest 
in using municipal bonds. Funded through the proceeds of projected business rate expansion, these bonds will 
be used to finance and deliver infrastructure investment in a similar way to North America.  
 
vi
 Under Schedule 1 paragraph 39 of the Local Government Finance Act 2012, the Secretary of State may 
designate a geographical area which would not be subject to future levies and resets, thereby creating an area 
(and a stream of revenue) which is outside the Business Rate Retention Scheme and outside the current local 
government spending envelope. The Non-Domestic Rating (Designated Areas) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/107) 
lists several dozen areas, many of which are New Development Deal Areas and Enterprise Zones, in which the 
local authority will retain 100% of business rates growth for the next 25 years. A further Order, the Non-
Domestic Rating (Designated Areas) Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/98), was made in early 2014. 
 
vii
 According to Section 115 (1) of the General Rate Act 1967 'hereditament means property which is or may 
become liable to a rate, being a unit of such property which is, or would fall to be, shown as a separate item in 
the valuation list.’ 
 
viii
 Rateable value is the amount equal to the rent at which the property might reasonably be expected to let 
from year to year. Current rateable values are based a valuation exercise that took part between April 2008 
and April 2010. 
 
ix
 The pooling facility is potentially a powerful tool in strategic urban governance because it allows 
neighbouring authorities to form growth coalitions. This could counteract some of the iniquities involved in 
intra urban competition. However, it remains the case that those authorities with smaller property tax 
portfolios will be subservient to those authorities that have greater property tax portfolios.  
 
x
 The concept of capitalisation in this paper refers to the general  ability of local governments to exploit 
property assets located within their administrative boundaries. Although clearly related, this is different to the 
concept of capitalisation in local government accounting which involves the tightly regulated conversion of 
capital into revenue. 
 
xi
 Occurs when existing levels of rent  are not sufficient to cover the cost of refurbishment or redevelopment 
 
